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Abstract  
I show that the application of the quantum-mechanical (QM) “which-way” weak 
measurement scheme of Vaidman may lead to logical inconsistencies. To this end, 
I study weak values of projection operators. Weak values are (normalized) 
amplitudes, operationally defined by a weak measurement followed by 
postselection. Projector weak values have a direct physical significance. This 
allows formulating an inconsistency in classical terms, viz., the contradiction in the 
readings of several measuring devices. To arrive at the contradiction, I also invoke 
the property of weak measurements not to “collapse the wave function” but to 
leave the state of the system unchanged (to lowest order in the weak measurement 
strength). My arguments rely entirely on basic QM rules plus commonly accepted 
weak QM measurement approximations. Therefore, the inconsistency challenges 
QM as such. 
1. Introduction 
Famously, in his lectures [1] Feynman pointed out how the basic rules of quantum 
mechanics (QM) may lead to “quantum weirdness”. By this is meant that QM sometimes 
leads to results that, based on classical preconceptions, may seem perplexing. These 
“weird” results, to the extent that they have been tested experimentally, have up until now 
been brilliantly confirmed.  
The review article [2] digs deeper into the questions how well quantum phenomena can be 
understood in classical terms. Among other things, this article exhibits situations in which 
only a genuine QM description applies, i.e., where no classical description whatsoever is 
able to reproduce the QM findings.    
It should be underlined that “weirdness” does not mean logical inconsistency. To arrive at 
a logical inconsistency one must exhibit a logical contradiction, i.e., one must show that a 
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statement p together with its negation   p both hold true.  Whether this can be exhibited 
for QM partly depends on exactly what QM postulates one invokes.  For example, the 
authors of [3] have arrived at a no-go theorem for QM, assuming a unitary evolution for all 
systems, even macroscopic ones, i.e., not assuming any von Neumann-like [4] “collapse of 
the wave function”.  
In this article, I investigate QM from a different point of view than in [3]. I do assume 
standard, orthodox QM, not excluding the von Neumann collapse postulate. What I do use 
is the concept of weak measurement, combined with the notion of postselection leading to 
the concept of a weak value [5] (see [6 - 7] for some reviews). More specifically, I use the 
fact that a weak value is a (normalized) transition amplitude, implying that a weak 
measurements allow one to study the amplitudes themselves. In a previous paper [8], I 
investigated whether the use of weak values of (combinations of) projection operators was 
free of inconsistencies and found examples where this was not the case. In the present 
article, I extend this analysis and argue that the inconsistencies reach the core of QM as 
such. 
My line of attack is strongly inspired by Vaidman’s approach [9 - 10] to “the past of a 
quantum particle”. Indeed, the argument I put forward is based on nothing but a slight 
reformulation of his approach. However, my presentation is arguably somewhat more basic 
than what, to my knowledge, up untill now exists in the literature. 
I stress from the outset that my treatment is based on nothing but ordinary QM and its 
standard interpretation, including the weak limit approximations commonly accepted in 
deductions within the QM weak measurement approach. 
In the next section, I present the basis of my approach. In the following sections I point out 
how a projector weak value may be used to establish the presence or not of an intermediate 
state in the QM description of a system, and apply it to a pair of projectors to arrive at a 
logical contradiction. A final section gives my conclusions. In the appendix, I illustrate my 
approach and conclusions by the so called three-box arrangement [11-12]. 
2. Basis of the “which-way” approach. 
Vaidman [9 - 10] was interested in studying the evolution of a quantum system from its 
preparation in an initial, “preselected” state | in > at a time ti  until its detection at a later 
time tf  in a final, “postselected” state | f >. The relevant entity for investigation of such 
evolution is the transition amplitude  < f | U(tf, ti) | in >, where U(tf, ti) is the unitary 
operator for the evolution from ti to tf  of the system under study. In particular, Vaidman 
proposed a procedure for answering the question: could the system, at an intermediate time 
tm , ti < tm <  ti , have occupied a specific eigenstate | ao> of a given system operator A?  
The first step of that procedure is to insert a complete set of (orthogonal) eigenstates 
{ | ak > }𝑘=0
𝑘=𝑁 of the operator A – here assumed to have a discrete, finite and non-degenerate 
spectrum – into the transition amplitude at time tm: 
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< f | U(tf, ti) | in >  = k  <f | U(tf, tm) | ak >  < ak |  U(tm, ti) | in > . (1) 
Concrete examples of such intermediate states  –which I also call “channels” – are the 
different paths that a photon may take through a set of interlocked Mach-Zehnder 
interferometers (MZIs) [10], the boxes in the three-box arrangement [11-12] or the 
different “pigeon-holes”  that the system may occupy in the quantum pigeon-hole setup 
[13].  
Note also that formula (1) expresses the Feynman dictum [1] of arriving at the transition 
probability prob(in → f) = | < f | U(tf, ti) | in > |
2
 by summing over all (indistinguishable) 
intermediate states before taking the square modulus. Indeed, the fact that QM probabilities 
are obtained from square moduli of transition amplitudes is vital for QM consistency, i.e., 
for “weirdness” not to imply logical contradictions. 
The second step in the procedure is to attach a von Neumann measuring device to the 
system at the “channel” | ao >, weakly measuring the projection operator o = | ao > < ao | 
at the intermediate time tm . In the usual treatment, this involves taking the limit g → 0 of a 
transition operator exp [  i g o ⊗ PM ] describing an (impulsive) interaction  between the 
system and a “von Neumann meter” with “pointer variable” canonical coordinates QM and 
PM. 
Two characteristics of this weak measurement procedure are of particular importance for 
my further arguments.  
The first is that, to zeroth order in the strength g of the weak measurement, the state 
U(tm, ti) | in > of the system just before the weak measurement remains the same 
immediately after that measurement: in the weak measurement limit, there is no “collapse 
of the wave function” [6]. I shall, moreover, specialize to the case of the system 
undergoing no non-trivial internal time-evolution during some finite time interval t  after 
tm; this assumption amounts to assuming that the system’s state remains unchanged (to 
lowest order in g) during this time interval. During t one may thus perform weak 
measurements of several different system projectors with the system represented (to lowest 
order in g) by the same state U(tm, ti) | in > as at time tm.  
The second characteristic of the weak measurement procedure is the role of the meter [6]. 
Namely, the mean value < QM >f of the pointer variable QM , after postselecting the state 
| f >, supplies the so called weak value (o)w of o : 
 limg→0 (< QM >f / g)  = <f | U(tf, tm) o U(tm, ti) | in > / < f | U(tf, ti) | in > ≡  
 ≡ <f | U(tf, tm) | ao >  < ao |  U(tm, ti) | in > / < f | U(tf, ti) | in >    ≝  (o)w .  (2) 
(For simplicity, I here assume the pointer variable mean value < QM >f to be zero for the 
idle meter. I also assume the value (o)w to be real; to get at an imaginary part of  (o)w 
needs measuring < PM >f in the same limit. Furthermore, I assume that the denominator 
< f | U(tf, ti) | in > of (o)w does not vanish.)  
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The weak value (o)w is thus nothing but – in the numerator  –the transition amplitude 
<f | U(tf, tm) o U(tm, ti) | in > through the state  | ao >  of Feynman’s formula (1), 
normalized – in the denominator – by the total transition amplitude < f | U(tf, ti) | in >. 
The weak value of a projector is thus a measurable quantity, albeit requiring repeated 
identical experiments to get at the statistically defined quantity < QM >f. Moreover, not 
only is it measurable, it is also amenable to a physical interpretation., as I now show.  
3. The physical interpretation of a projector weak value 
The entity (o)w differs from zero if and only if the system on its evolution to the final 
state | f > could occupy the state | ao >  at time tm, in the sense that there is a non-zero 
contribution to the sum in eq.(1) from the term involving the state | ao >.  In other words, 
the non-vanishing or not of (o)w  – i.e. whether the von Neumann meter gives a signal or 
remains idle  – supplies a YES/NO answer to the question: is  the state | ao > a possible 
intermediate state of the system at time tm ? (Some intricacies are involved here, though, 
related to what in [14 - 16] is called “non-representative weak values” of projectors. I 
assume throughout the present article that all weak values are “representative” in the sense 
mentioned there.) And this answer is provided in terms of classical pieces of data, viz., the 
triggering or not of the von Neumann meter.  
I stress that it is the non-vanishing or not of the weak value that is of importance for the 
triggering of the meter; whether the weak value is positive or negative is of no importance 
(nor is the  possibility of it taking a complex value, provided one were to  allow for a meter 
also measuring < PM >f ). Neither do any considerations of “contextuality” (see, e.g., [17-
18] and references therein) or the like enter. 
4. Comparison between weak and strong measurements. 
Note the similarities but also the differences between weak measurements and ordinary, 
strong or projective measurements.  
A strong measurement of a projector provides a (probabilistic) answer to whether the state 
| ao > is a possible intermediate state of the system. Moreover, QM furnishes the 
probability prob(in → ao) = | < ao| U(tm, ti) | in > |
2
 for the outcome of such measurement 
(or, if a postselection  applies, the probability prob ( f | ao, in) ≡  prob ( in →  f via ao ) = 
|<f | U(tf, tm) | ao >  < ao| U(tm, ti) | in > |
2
 ). A strong measurement thus furnishes a classical 
piece of data in form of this probability.  
Furthermore, the state of the system after a strong measurement with outcome | ao > 
“collapses” to that state, implying that any immediately following measurement on the 
system will be on this collapsed state, not on the unperturbed system state.  
On the other hand, within standard QM, weak projector measurements can directly offer 
only a YES/NO answer to whether the state | ao > is a possible intermediate state of the 
system. (Since the absolute square of the numerator of the weak value (o)w equals  
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prob(in → f via ao), weak measurements of both real and imaginary parts of o, plus a 
measurement of prob ( in →  f ) ≡ prob ( f | in) = | < f | U(tf, ti)| in >|
2
, could indeed supply 
the  probability  prob ( f | ao, in). It would, however, be in a more indirect way, requiring 
several different kinds of measurement.) This answer is provided by the triggering or not 
of the von Neumann meter, i.e., in terms of classical data. In other words, a weak 
measurement can directly tell whether, at the intermediate time tm , the total state of the 
system on its evolution to the postselected state, could proceed or not through the state 
| ao >.   
What is even more important, a weak measurement, contrary to a strong one, does not 
“collapse” the state but leaves it unperturbed, to leading order in the weak measurement 
strength g [6]. 
In short, a weak projector measurement directly tests for the presence of an amplitude 
without (to lowest order) disturbing the system.  A strong measurement, however, 
measures a corresponding amplitude squared, at the same time in general heavily 
disturbing the state of the system.  
Note in particular that the question regarding the presence of a particular state in the 
expansion (1) of the system’s total transition amplitude – a statement within the QM 
formalism – has, through the weak measurement followed by postselection,  been reduced 
to a registration (albeit a statistical one) in a measuring apparatus, i.e., a classical datum. 
5. Application to a pair of projectors. 
Let me now apply this general framework to two different projectors for the system, say o 
= | ao >  < ao | and 1 = | a1 >  < a1 |, both being projectors onto eigenstates of the given 
operator A. Since I assume | ao > and | a1 > to be orthogonal, the combination 
+
 = o + 
1 is also a projector. The projector 
+
 could be a non-local operator, for example 
involving intermediate states representing different spatial locations in a nested MZI. The 
measurement of such non-local projectors should, however, cause no problems of 
principles regarding simultaneous measurements within the framework of non-relativistic 
QM; such measurements are (at least implicitly) assumed, e.g., in [11]. 
Next, think of weakly measuring +, o and 1 separately by separate von Neumann 
measuring devises, each with their own measurement strength. These measurements are 
thought of as taking place during the time interval t  defined above, i.e., during which the 
state of the system remains unchanged (to lowest order in the weak measurement 
strengths). Then (o)w tests for the presence of | ao >  as an intermediate state, and (1)w 
independently tests for the presence of | a1 >. The weak value (
+
)w  tests for the presence 
of either | ao >  or | a1 > (or both): if the 
+
-meter triggers, one may conclude that either 
| ao >  or | a1 > (or both) are possible intermediate states, if it does not trigger one 
concludes that neither is a possible intermediate state. 
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6. The contradiction. 
Now comes the punch line.  
It is easy to find even simple systems (see the appendix) for which (+)w vanishes, while 
both (o)w and  (1)w individually are different from zero. From what has been said, this is 
interpreted to mean that both | ao > and | a1 > are present as intermediate states when tested 
individually, while none is present when tested as a pair.  Since the vanishing or not of the 
weak values involved are classical pieces of data – registrations in the respective von 
Neumann meters – this is a logical contradiction. 
In trying to understand the basic cause for this contradiction, one must keep in mind that a 
weak value is a (normalized) amplitude while at the same time providing a classical piece 
of data through the weak von Neumann protocol. And while interference between 
amplitudes is legion, it is crucial in the usual arguments for the logical consistency of QM 
that its basic rules furnish classical data in terms of amplitudes squared. Taking the square 
modulus – and observing that the “collapse of the wave function” has decisive influence on 
sequential measurements –  so to speak “hides” the consequences of such interferences. As 
this usual argument goes, there are no logical inconsistencies, at most “merely” the well-
known QM “weirdnesses” in terms of clashes between QM predictions and preconceived, 
classically based expectations [1-2].  
On the other hand, invoking weak measurements and postselection allows one, 
metaphorically speaking, to “sneak inside the square modulus” to study intermediate 
transition amplitudes directly, at the same time being sure that the measurements are made 
on the same state of the system. Moreover, one may establish the vanishing or not of these 
amplitudes in terms of classical data– the triggering or not of a meter.  This enables the 
direct study of the consequences of interference between amplitudes in terms of classical 
concepts, leading to the type of logical contradictions pointed out here. 
7. Conclusion 
Using standard quantum mechanics applied to weak measurements of projectors, I have 
derived a logical contradiction expressed in terms of three classically phrased statements. 
Since my arguments are built on nothing but basic quantum mechanics and commonly 
accepted weak measurement approximations within that same framework, I see no escape 
from the conclusion that these inconsistencies have their roots in the fundaments of 
quantum mechanics. 
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 Appendix 
The so-called three-box arrangement [11-12], furnishes a simple example of the situation 
treated in the main text.  
Consider a one-particle system, with no non-trivial time evolution, in which the particle 
could be in any of three “boxes” A, B or C, represented by states | A >, | B > and | C > in a 
three-dimensional Hilbert space. Let the preselected state be  
| in > = ( | A > + | B > + | C > ) / √3  ,   (A1) 
and the postselected state be 
 | f  > = ( | A > + | B >  | C > ) / √3  .   (A2) 
One is interested in finding which intermediate states the particle may have occupied, i.e. 
properties of the projectors ΠA = | A >< A |, ΠB = | B >< B | and ΠC = | C >< C | at an 
intermediate time. 
One easily finds both weak values (ΠA)w and  (ΠC)w  to be non-zero, a fact that is 
interpreted as the presence of | A >  and  | C >   as possible intermediate state. But testing 
this on ΠA + ΠC gives a vanishing value for (ΠA + ΠC )w, so no particle intermediately 
neither in box A nor in box C. 
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